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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NEIL JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Ca::;e No. 17621

JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a
corporation, and AETNA
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

ARGUMENT
POINT I
VENUE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID IN SANPETE COUNTY
AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDAl~TS' MOTION FOR
CHANGE OF VENUE.
Respondent argues that §78-13-6, U.C.A. is the correct
venue statute to be applied in this action.
Brief, p. 19-25).

(Respondent's

In the alternative, Respondent states

that even assuming arguendo that §78-13-4, U.C.A. is applicable as advocated by Appellants that statute
venue to be laid in Sanpete County.
p. 26-29).

also requires

(Respondent's Brief,

Both of these arguments, howver, are erroneous.

Under no circumstances can §78-13-6, U.C .A. be applicable
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to this case.

It states that "all transitory causes of

action arising without this state in favor of residents of
this state shall, if action is brought thereon in this state,
be brought and tried in the county where the plaintiff
rcridcs or in the county where the principal defendant
resides.

.

(Emphasis added).

Respondent argues that the instant case is a "transitory
action" (Respondent's Brief, p. 21-22).

Appellants certainly

do not contest this statement and, in fact, would add that
all contracts are transitory in their nature as opposed to
local actions involving real property.

Thus, the word "transi-

tory" adds nothing to the interpretation now being advocated
by Respondent.
The cause of action in this case did not "arise in Colorado"
as claimed by Respondent.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 22).

Citing

the same authority relied upon by Respondent, "a cause of
action is said to arise generally at the place where the ac.t
creating the right to bring an action occurred."
§37.

(Emphasis added).

77 Arn. Jur.2d

The phrase "transitory causes of

action arising" is different from phrases referring to "where
the injury occurred which is then the place at which point
the damage or wrongful act took place."

Id.

Based upon the jury's verdict, the injury or wrong
occurred in

Co~orado.

The jury found that the defendant had

-2-
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wrongfully failed to comply with the terms of the contract
by not accepting the lambs in Colorado--the injury, therefore, occurred in Colorado.

However, the right to bring

the lawsuit was acquired in Utah since this is where the
written contracts between the parties were made.
dent's Brief, p. 20).

( l<O' spon-

Thus, the cause of action in this

case arose within the state of Utah and §78-13-6 is therefuu
completely inapplicable.
This Court in Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co.,
216 P. 684 (Utah 1923) established the rule that all written
contracts are to be governed by the predecessor of §78-13-4,
U.C.A.

This section allows a plaintiff to sue a defendant

either in the

county in which the defendant resides or in

the county in which the contract is to be performed.

As

to all other types of contracts not in writing defendants
"are not authorized to be tried out of the county where the
defendant resides."
The Court in Buckle specifically referred to contractu~
actions as "transitory" when it stated that the "general
modern tendency is to fix the venue of transitory actions at
the residence of the defendant."

216 P. at 685.

This Court subsequently in Atlas Acceptance Corp.,~,
Palfreyman, and Simmons has consistently held that if a
plaintiff is unable to prove from the face of the written

-3-
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agreement the place of performance then the correct venue
is at the defendant's residence.

(See discussion of cases

in Appellants' Brief in chief, p. 17-21).

These decisions

are in no way modified by the Court's decision in Dee v.
San Pedro referred to by the respondent.
In Dee, the purported bona fide assignee of a cause of
action for damages brought suit in the county of his residence, Weber County, for injuries to certain horses transported by the defendant railroad company, which had its
principal place of business in Salt Lake County.

The

defendant railroad moved for a change of venue on the
grounds that §2932 and §2933 of Chapter 93, Session Laws
of Utah 1913, controlled venue.
The court indicated that defendant's motion was regular
and sufficient, as the case stood then, to have entitled the
defendant to have the action transferred to Salt Lake County.
However, before the Weber County court ruled in the defendant's
motion for change of venue, the plaintiff obtained permission
to amend its Complaint to allege that the cause of action
arose outside the State of Utah, in the states of Nevada
and California.

Plaintiff's amendment brought the case within

the provisions of the statute, and the plaintiff elected,
as provided in the statute, to bring the action in the
county where he resided.

The defendant renewed its motion

-4-
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for a change of venue.
The determinative venue issues in Dee were in the naturs
of standing questions:

whether the plaintiff was a bona

fide assignee of the cause of action and resident of Weber
County in whose favor the transitory cause of action arose;
whether the person in whose favor the cause of action arose
was a resident of Weber County.

When the defendant had

renewed its motion for change of venue, it had omitted to
negative the plaintiff's assertion in his Amended Complaint
that he was a bona fide assignee of the cause of action and
the plaintiff's assertion in his Amended Complaint that the
person in whose favor the cause of action arose was a resident of Weber County.

Having failed to negative the

"standi~::

allegations in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, defendant's
motion for change of venue was denied.

Here, proper affi-

davits were timely filed by Defendants and therefore no
standing question is presented.
The Dee case does not modify the rule established in
the previously cited cases that in the abaence of express
terms of a written contract showing the place of performance
this Court will require suit to be brought in the county of
the defendant.

Respondent argues, however, that the place

of performance can be implied from the contract, from the
course of dealings, and from the Federal Packers and Stock-
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yards Act that the place of performance is Sanpete County.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 26-29).

Appellants would dispute

that an implication obtained outside of the document itself
can be utilized in determining place of performance since
plaintiffs in the previously cited cases also argued extcinsic
evidence which was expressly rejected by this Court.

See,

for example, Palfreyman in which plaintiffs argued that the
maintenance of an office implied performance in the county
where the office was maintained.
Assuming arguendo, however, that implications are proper
Plaintiff's argument still is invalid.
Respondent contradicts himself when he states that:
. . . if the seller is not present to receive
the check at the time of delivery of the sheep,
the payment must be timely mailed first class,
postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the
seller.
7 U.S.C., §228b. Regs. of Sec. of
Agriculture, Packers and Stockyards Act,
9 C.F.R., Sec. 201.43. (Respondent's Brief, p. 27).
Respondent's own statement reveals that Sanpete County was
to be the place of performance by the payment obligation
only if Respondent was not present to receive payment at
the time of delivery in California or Colorado.
In 1978, Respondent had been in the sheep business for
more than twenty-five years, having raised and sold lambs
for over ten years and having worked with appellant John Clay
and Co. for four years.

Respondent maintains that, "Advance

-6-
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notice to the seller prior to shipping is clearly the
accepted custom and practice in the livestock industry"
(Respondent's Brief, p. 10).

Respondent "wanted to see

that his lambe were handled property"
p.

(Respondent's Brief,

9).

Respondent testified to his numerous demands upon
appellant John Clay and Co. for notice.
143-44, 325, 619, 654-55).

(Tr. 81, 82, 84,

Respondent clearly intended to

be present when appellant John Clay and Co. took delivery
of the lambs.

The livestock contract provided:

"Balance

of purchase price shall be paid when livestock are loaded
on cars."

Where the balance of the purchase price was

to~

paid is specified in the Packers and Stockyards Act.
Section 201.43 (b) (2) (ii) of the Act codifies the
preferred practice in the livestock industry that the place
of performance of the payment obligation is the place of
delivery:
No . . . dealer purchasing livestock for
slaughter, shall mail a check in payment for
the livestock unless (a) the check is made
available for actual delivery and the seller
or his duly authorized representative is not
present to receive payment, at the point of
transfer of possession of such livestock, on
or before the close of the next business day
following purchase of the livestock and transfer of possession thereof . . . .
Section 201. 43 (b) (2) (ii) expressly contemplates that
the seller or his duly authorized representative may not be
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present, in which case only shall payment be mailed to the
sellers to such address as the seller may direct.

Thus,

the payment provision in the contracts herein could read
as follows applying these implications:

"Balance of purchase

price sLetll be paid when ctnd where livestock are loaded on
cars; and only if seller or his duly authorized representative
is not then and there present shall payment be mailed forthwith to the seller to such address as the seller may direct."
Clearly, in accordance with the preferred and accepted custom
and practice in the livestock industry, no one specific
place can be made by necessary implication to appear from
the express terms on the face of the livestock contract.
The preferred and accepted custom and practice in the
livestock industry is to notify the seller so that the
seller can be present to see that the livestock are handled
properly and so that the seller can be present to receive
payment on the spot from the dealer.

Under the circumstances

it cannot have been said that the necessary implication
made to appear from the express terms on the face of the
livestock contract was that the place of performance of the
payment obligation was Sanpete County, Utah.

The most that

could have been said, as Respondent himself has stated, was
"that if payment for the sheep was not made to Plaintiff at
the time and place of delivery in California or Colorado,
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payment would be made by mailing to Plaintiff's residence
in Sanpete County."

(Respondent's Brief, p. 27).

Utah law requires that the place of performance of
obligation necessarily be made to appear by implication
from the express terms on the

fa~e

of the contcact.

Utah

law does not say that venue may lie at any secondary or
conditional place of payment which might be made by necessary
implication to appear from the face of the written contract.
California might have been the place for performance of the
payment obligation; Colorado might have been the place for
performance; Sanpete County might have been the place.

No

one specific and unconditional place for performance can
have been made to appear by necessary implication from the
express terms on the face of the contract.
In summary, the cause of action in this case cannot
be said under theory to have risen outside of the State of
Utah and, in addition, all written transitory contractual
actions are governed by §78-13-4, U.C.A.

If the plaintiff

is able to show a place of performance he is then able to
bring an action in the county where the performance is to
occur.

In absence of an express showing of such performance

by the terms of the contract itself, however, the traditional
rule applies and defendant must be sued in his own county.
Here, the lower court committed prejudicial error in failing

-9-
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to follow this mandatory venue requirement.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
TO THE JURY At'JD IN SUBSEQUENTLY AWARDING
ATTORNEYS' FEES WHEN THERE WAS NO BASIS
UNDEP. UTAH LAW FOR SUCH AN INSTRUCTION.
Respondent complained against John Clay and Co. for
(1) alleged breach of contract obligation to take delivery
of 6,283 lambs, and (2) alleged breach of a contract obligation
to pay amounts due under the c6ntract.

The livestock contracts

contained no provision whatsoever for payment of attorneys'
fees.

The lower court awarded some $20,000 in attorneys'

fees based upon the jury's finding of $1.00 punitive damages.
In breach of contract actions, attorneys' fees can be
considered as an element of damages only in those cases
in which exemplary damages are awarded.

DeBry & Hilton Travel

v. Capital International Airways, 538 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978).
In DeBry, the plaintiff prayed for punitive damages and
attorneys' fees by reason of the defendant's malicious conduct,
and by reason of the defendant's bad faith in its conduct
toward the plaintiff.

An

award of punitive damages was

denied, and thus the trial court properly denied counsel fees.
In affirming the lower court's denial of attorneys' fees, this
Court cited Dahl v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951) in
which the Court had reversed an award of attorneys' fees

-10-
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"where there was no basis for an award of punitive damages."
583 P.2d at 1185.

Appellants dispute the propriety of punitiv:

damages in this action for breach of contract.

Appellants

submit that there was no basis for an award of even $1.00
in punitive

damages.

On page 31 of his brief, Respondent states:
Even the case of Lyman Grazing Association
v. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 905 (1970)
cited by Appellants states that attorneys' fees
are appropriate upon a showing of fraud, malice
or wantonness such as would sustain an award of
punitive damages.
473 P.2d at 908.
Lyman was a suit for injunctive relief, not a suit for
loss of bargain.

This Court stated the rule in whole:

It is a well-established rule that a court
although awarding affirmative injunctive relief
to a plaintiff or complinant, will not award
attorneys' fees in the absence of a showing of
such fraud, malice or wantonness as would authorize
an award of punitive damages. . . . 473 P.2d at
908.
Respondent confuses the rule in an action for injunctive
relief in an equitable proceeding such as Lyman, with the
contract law principle of:
. . . "just compensation" which requires
only that a plaintiff be placed in the same
position he would have occupied but for the
breach.
Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 2d
339, 352, 241 P.2d 914, 920 (1952).
This distinction has been stated as follows:
Thus, the defendant's motive for a breach
is generally deemed irrelevant . . . unless one

-11-
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b

who holds himself out to the community to perform
special services, such as a lawyer, trust company,
or realtor, assumes fiduciary duties which,
if
breached, subject him to punitive damages as a
matter of public policy and recovery of punitive
damages is improper unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the willful and malicious nature
of the defendant's breach constitutes an independent
tort.
1979 Utah Law Rev., 369. (Emphasis added).
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) appears
at first blush to suggest a departure from the long-standing
rule in Utah of "just compensation" in actions for breach of
contract.

The Court indicated, however, that the defendant

there owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty to act in good
faith and to deal fairly with the plaintiff.

One conunentator

has stated with reference to Nash:
The defendant's breach of this duty was
apparently the key to the court's determination
that a jury might reasonably conclude that the
defendant acted willfully and maliciously.
Implicit in the court's reasoning should be
the notion that a willful and malicious breach of
contract, sufficient to justify an award of
punitive damages, can result when a fiduciary duty
exists between the parties that is apart from and
in addition to their contractual duties.
Nash, therefore, should not be construed to
include in its sweep every intentional breach.
Efficiency in the marketplace results from
permitting a party to breach a contract if he
can obtain a more favorable bargain elsewhere.
The right to breach should be allowed as long
as the non-breaching party receives the equivalent
of performance.
The rule of "just compensation"
should continue to be the ceiling for the breach
of contractual duties.
1979 Utah Law Rev., 370.
Appellant John Clay and Co. owed Respondent no fiduciary
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duty under the livestock contracts.

Respondent neither

alleged nor proved any independent tort to have been
committed by appellant John Clay and Co.

Respondent

neither alleged nor proved that appellant John Clay and
Co. committed any fraud.

There was no basis for an award

of punitive damages in the case at bar.
Respondent claims that appellant John Clay and Co.
breached its duty under the livestock contracts to act in
good faith toward Respondent, and that appellant John Clay
and Co. 's alleged breach of such a duty entitled him to
punitive damages.

Respondent, however, cites no law wherein

breach of an alleged duty to act in good faith has been the
basis for an award of punitive damages.
Zions' Properties v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975),
is inapposite, because the implied contract covenant there
concerned a covenant of good faith and cooperation preventing
either party to a contract from rendering it difficult or
impossible for the other party to continue performance and
then taking advantage of the non-performance he has caused.
Respondent did not claim that John Clay rendered it difficult
or impossible for Respondent to continue performance, and
that John Clay and Co. sought to take advantage of any nonperformance on Respondent's part.

If anything, appellant

John Clay and Co. claimed that Respondent breached his covenan'

-13-
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of good faith and cooperation by rendering it difficult or
impossible for John Clay and Co. to take delivery of the
lambs before they became too heavy.
In support of his claim that a breach of a duty to
act in good faith can be the basis for an aword of punitive
damages, Respondent cites three cases concerning the common
legal principle that in every insurance contract there is
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Gruenberg

v. Aetna Insurance Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032,
1037 (1973); Garrett v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,
520 S.W.2d 102, 121 (Mo. App.); First Security Bank of
Bozeman v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Mont. 1979).

The

case at bar does not concern an insurance contract.
On pages 35 and 36 of his brief, Respondent sets forth
"evidence" of appellant John Clay and Co.'s "attitude of
reckless disregard for Plaintiff's right to be treated
honestly and fairly under the contract."

Respondent simply

recounts matters going to the alleged breach of contract and
matters going to "attempted" wrongful conduct on the part of
appellant John Clay and Co.

Respondent does not set forth

egregious conduct akin to selling brucellosis infected
cattle (Kiser v. Gilmore, 2 Kan. App.2d 638, 587 P.2d 911
(1979); or refusing to pay a valid health insurance claim
(Curtiss v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 90 N.M. App. 1976);

-14-
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or fraudulently falsifying weight records (Whitehead v.
Allen, 36 N.M. 63, 313 P.2d 335 (1957).
Respondent neither alleged nor proved any breach of a
fiduciary duty, any independent tort, or any fraud.

No

grounds under Utah law were alleged or proved '''. ··rn which an
award of punitive damages could be based.

Respondent sued

for breach of contract to recoup his loss of bargain.

It

cannot be said that Appellants' defense of this action was
withollt merit or good faith.

It would not comport with this

Court's ideas of either law or justice to assess Appellants
attorney fees for entertaining bona fide questions about hls
legal obligations and seeking adjudication thereon in the
courts of this State.

Western Casualty and Surety Co. v.

Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980).
Communist countries assess a fine against a defaulting
promiser, payable to the injured promisee, as a "form of
social criticism."

In contrast, courts in this country, as

in most of the rest of the world, expressly reject the notion
that remedies for breach of contract have punishment as a
goal, and with rare exceptions, refuse to grant "punitive
damages" for breach of contract.

"Legal Remedies for

Breach of Contract," 70 Columbia Law Rev., 1146.
On pages 37-38 of his brief, Respondent states that
"[P)unitive damages are often necessary to fully compensate

-15-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the plaintiff, particularly if the economic bargaining power
of the plaintiff is inferior to the 'oppressors'
defendants Clay and Monfort.}"

To

(i.e.,

assess punitive damages

against appellant John Clay and Co. in this case would be
contrary to ali l·
by this Court.

~nciples

of contract law and past decisions

This Court must reverse the award of $1.00

as punitive damages, since there is no evidence even for
this nominal award.
In addition, of course, the $21,400.00 attorney fees
and costs is totally unjustified even assuming arguendo
punitive damages are proper since the fees are some 20,000
times the punitive damages awarded.

The trial court

conunitted prejudicial error in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury and in subsequently awarding
attorneys'

fees when there was no basis under Utah law for

such award.
POINT III
THE AMOUNT OF RESPONDENT'S ALLEGED LOSS
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MEASURED BY FACTS AND
FIGURES ASCERTAINABLE PRIOR TO JUDGMENT
AND THUS THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF
PREJUDMENT INTEREST WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Four questions were presented to the jury for resolution
which had a direct bearing on the issue of damages:
1.

Did Respondent unduly delay the shipment of lambs

and thus precipitate Monfort's refusal to take delivery of
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Respondent's overweight lambs from John Clay and Co.?
2.

Did Respondent's undue delay, if any, contribute to

unnecessary weight gain for which Respondent sought to charge
Appellant John Clay and Co.?
3.

How much weight did the lambs gain 11:rn0cessarily?

4.

Did Respondent mitigate his losses by accepting the

most commercially reasonable offer for the 6,283 lambs?
The answers to these questions had a direct bearing on
the "date certain" upon which damages should have been
computed and the standards of value which should have been
used to ascertain damages.
Clearly, if Respondent unduly delayed shipment and
caused Monfort's refusal to take the lambs, then no damages
should properly have been assessed against appellants John
Clay and Co. or Aetna.

If Respondent unduly delayed

shipment and precipitated Monfort's refusal to take the
lambs, the Appellants should not have been assessed for
the weight gained by the time the lambs were finally sold to
R. H. Rock.

If R. H. Rock's offer of $70.20 per head

($70.20/hd. x 6,283 hd. = $441,066.60) was not commercially
reasonable compared to appellant John Clay and Co. 's offer
of $.66 per pound up to 120 pounds ($.66/lb. x 120 lbs. x
6,283 lambs

$497,613.60) then Appellants should not have

been assessed the $56,547.00 difference.
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The amount of the loss for which Respondent sought
prejudgment interest could not have been measured by facts
and figures ascertainable at any particular fixed time
prior to judgment, nor calculable with mathematical accuracy.
The

a~10ctllt

of damages must necessarily have been ascertained

and assessed by the trier of fact at the trial, and thus
prejudgment interest properly should not have been awarded.
Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977).
This matter should therefore be remanded to the lower court
for entry of prejudgment interest as to the freight and 274
lambs only.
CONCLUSION
Respondent failed to establish that this action fell
within any one of the statutory exceptions to the general
rule that persons sued have the right to have the action
brought and tried in the county in which they reside or in
which, as here, they maintain their principal and only place
of business.

The failure to allow suit to be tried in the

correct county was reversible error.
Respondent neither alleged nor proved that appellant
John Clay and Co. breached any fiduciary duty, committed any
intentional tort, or perpetrated any fraud.

Respondent

merely alleged and endeavored to prove that appellant John
Clay and Co. breached the livestock contracts.

No basis

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

existed under Utah law for the trial court to submit the
issue of punitive damages to the

~ury;

the trial court's

award of attorneys' fees and litigation costs to Respondent
was prejudicial and improper.

Respondent was entitled to

"just compensation" only for appellant John Clay and Co. 's
alleged breach of contract.
In order for any "date certain" or "standards of

val~"

to have been used to calculate damages, it was necessary first I
for the jury to make certain of factual findings concerning
any undue delay in delivery caused by Respondent and whether
Respondent mitigated his losses in the most corrunercially
reasonable manner.

The amount of loss for which Respondent

sought prejudgment interest could not have been measured
by facts and figures ascertainable at any particular fixed
time prior to judgment, nor calculable with mathematical
accuracy.

The trial court's award of prejudgment interest

regarding the 6,283 lambs was erroneous and constituted
prejudicial error.

The award should be vacated.

For the preceding reasons, therefore, the judgment below
should be vacated and a new trial ordered.

In the alterna-

tive, the award of punitive damages, attorneys' fees and
prejudgment interest should be vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard Stein
Richard Campbell
STEIN & CAMPBELL
Craig S. Cook
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